PC Partner Group Limited

Singapore · Computer hardware & electronics manufacturing

SGX: PCT · Information cut-off 20 August 2026

What the company is

PC Partner buys graphics processing units and memory, assembles them into graphics cards, and sells them — under its own brands through distributors in more than 70 countries, and on an ODM/OEM basis to other manufacturers. It also runs a contract-electronics business making ATM and point-of-sale hardware, and sells mini-PCs and motherboards. Manufacturing is in Dongguan, China and, since the end of FY2024, Batam, Indonesia.

The cost structure tells you what kind of business this is. Raw materials were 87.6% of revenue in FY2025 and 81.7% in 1H2026; the conversion cost of direct labour and production overhead was HK$300.5m and HK$116.3m respectively, on revenue of HK$13,951.7m and HK$6,450.2m. Gross margin has ranged from 6.8% to 27.7% across the seven years to FY2025.

The mix is becoming less diversified, not more:

Computed as each product line ÷ total revenue, from the disaggregation-of-revenue table in the segment note (AR FY2025 p.142; 1H2026 announcement p.16).

The fifteen-year record

PC Partner has been listed since January 2012 and the full history is available. It is dominated by one year.

Cumulative profit attributable to owners across FY2011–FY2025 was HK$5,093.2m. FY2021 alone was 46.6% of it. Cumulative revenue over the same fifteen years was HK$123,866.6m, so the revenue-weighted through-cycle net margin on the full record is 4.11% (5,093.2 ÷ 123,866.6). The median annual margin over the same fifteen years is 2.57% and the equal-weighted mean 3.02%; the three differ because revenue share and margin are strongly positively correlated for this issuer, so any revenue-weighted measure loads on the boom years. The company recorded a loss in FY2015 and came close to breakeven twice more, at HK$10.3m in FY2019 and HK$60.8m in FY2023.

Reported operating cash flow does not mean what a reader would assume

This is the single most consequential thing in the filings, and the issuer discloses every component needed to see it while never making the adjustment itself.

PC Partner settles supplier invoices with import loans. The bank pays the supplier; the group’s trade payable is extinguished and a borrowing appears in its place. No cash moves. In the cash flow statement that non-cash transfer is presented inside the operating “trade and other payables” line, while the later repayment of the loan appears as a financing outflow. The size of the transfer is disclosed each year in the reconciliation of liabilities arising from financing activities (note 33 in the FY2025 accounts, p.180).

Removing it gives an analytical operating-cash-flow proxy. This is a classification adjustment: the reported net change in cash remains as filed, so the arithmetic reconciliation is not independent validation:

Two facts follow, and they point in different directions. Cumulative reported operating cash flow of HK$22.5bn compares with HK$4.3bn once the gross-up is removed — a factor of five. But over the same six years that HK$4,309m of operating cash compares with HK$4,101m of profit, a ratio of 1.05x: the annual swings are working-capital timing, not accrual quality. FY2025’s negative HK$129m is the deliberate inventory build (inventories rose HK$849.8m, or 100.9%) plus receivables; 1H2026 swung back to a positive HK$587m.

Where five years of cash went

HK$m, from the consolidated statements of cash flows in the FY2021, FY2023 and FY2025 annual reports. Cash and bank balances are as the statement defines them: net of pledged deposits and of time deposits with an initial maturity over three months.

The repayment of import loans is the financing-side proof of the gross-up above. It appears in every one of the five years, and in four of them there is no matching drawdown line anywhere in the statement — because the drawdowns are the non-cash transfers out of trade payables that inflate reported operating cash flow. Over the five years the group repaid HK$14.17bn of import loans. Over the same five years the transfers into those borrowings, from the table above, total HK$14.28bn. The two figures are within 0.8% of each other, which is what one expects of a facility whose balance barely moved: the money is the same money, counted once as an operating inflow and once as a financing outflow, and neither line can be understood from its own side of the statement.

Capital spending happened twice and was two different things. FY2022 spent HK$538.9m — four to sixteen times any other year in the table — and the property, plant and equipment note shows HK$403.1m of that went into leasehold land and buildings, with HK$84.7m of plant and machinery behind it. FY2024’s additions were HK$149.5m — HK$101.5m of plant and machinery and HK$26.3m of improvements — of which HK$140.8m was paid in cash that year, the difference being prepayments made in FY2023 and capitalised in FY2024. FY2022 needs no such distinction: its additions and its cash payment are the same HK$538.9m. The two are not the same project. The FY2022 building is a single office floor in Kowloon — about 18,572 square feet at roughly HK$387.9m, plus twenty car parking spaces — bought to relocate the head office and cut rent, and carried since as pledged office premises. The FY2024 machinery went to Batam: the company puts about HK$107.1m into three production lines and renovation at the new Indonesian facility, and about HK$16.2m into the new Singapore head office. The company’s own capital expenditure disclosure for FY2022 is a single sentence giving the total and nothing else; the composition is only in the note.

The dividend followed the profit down with a one-year lag, and then stopped moving. HK$934.3m was paid out in FY2022 — the largest single line in the table after the loan repayments, and 39% of FY2021’s HK$2,374m attributable profit, paid in the year after that profit was earned. FY2023’s payment then fell 85% to HK$135.8m, and FY2024 and FY2025 were HK$155.2m each — the same figure twice, against attributable profits of HK$262m and HK$494m. Cumulatively HK$1.79bn of dividends across FY2020–FY2025 — FY2020 itself paid none — against HK$4.10bn of attributable profit and HK$4.31bn of operating cash flow over the same six years once the gross-up is removed. That is a 44% payout of profit, and 42% of the cash the business actually produced.

Cash and bank balances have fallen in every year but the last two: HK$3.76bn at the end of FY2021, HK$2.21bn a year later, and HK$2.51bn now. The HK$1.56bn fall in FY2022 is accounted for almost entirely by the dividend and the building: HK$934.3m and HK$538.9m together are HK$1.47bn, in a year when reported operating cash flow was HK$2.67bn and the same year’s gross-up was HK$3.74bn — that is, the underlying operating cash flow was negative.

The Hong Kong to Singapore move was about GPU supply, and the company says so

The circular convening the EGM to approve the HKEX withdrawal (18 September 2025) states the Singapore primary listing was expected to bring “enhanced flexibility in procurement of high-end GPUs from its key suppliers”, and warns there is “no guarantee that the Group will not be affected by future changes to trade restrictions and tariffs” (pp.10–11). The FY2025 chairman’s statement is more direct: the listing transition and headquarters relocation “restored PC Partner’s access to NVIDIA’s flagship RTX 5090 graphics processing unit” (p.8).

The effect is quantified in the same report: the RTX 5090 series contributed HK$1,687.2m of revenue in FY2025, 15.8% of own-brand graphics-card revenue (p.15).

Sequence, from the filings: SGX secondary listing by introduction 15 November 2024; conversion to primary listing announced 8 August 2025; EGM approval and HKEX Listing Committee approval, autumn 2025; last day of dealing on HKEX 8 January 2026; listing withdrawn 14 January 2026.

A disclosure that existed at IPO and no longer does

The 2011 HKEX listing prospectus disclosed the group’s supplier concentration in detail: NVIDIA alone was 27%, 36%, 33% and 28% of total purchases across FY2008–1H2011, and “AMD and NVIDIA together supplied all of the discrete GPUs used by the Group” (pp.12, 50, 165). The HKEX-format annual reports then carried a “Major customers and suppliers” table in the Report of the Directors every year:

Report of the Directors, “Major customers and suppliers”: AR FY2020 p.76, AR FY2023 p.92, AR FY2024 p.108. The section is absent from the FY2025 annual report across all 210 pages.

Two things are visible in that table. Dependence on a single supplier rose monotonically from roughly a third of purchases at listing to 72% by FY2024, with the top five at 83% — while the customer book moved the other way. And the FY2025 annual report, the first prepared in SGX format, dropped the table entirely, along with the five-year financial summary: the Report of the Directors required under the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance was replaced by a Directors’ Statement that does not carry it. The SGX rulebook does not require what the Hong Kong one did, so nothing improper follows — but the effect is that the concentration which drives this company’s cost base stopped being visible in the same year its results turned on it.

Customer concentration moved the other way, and improved markedly. The prospectus disclosed the top five customers at 39–44% of turnover and the largest single customer at 10–16%. The FY2025 and FY2024 accounts state that no customer contributed 10% or more of revenue in either year (AR FY2025 p.143).

What happened in the first half of 2026

Revenue was essentially flat at HK$6,450.2m (+1.5%), but gross profit rose 58.7% to HK$1,062.8m and profit attributable to owners rose 117.9% to HK$545.5m. Gross margin went from 10.5% to 16.5%.

The company attributes this to average selling prices. Its own disclosures, from the MD&A (pp.30–31):

• Own-brand graphics cards: revenue −9.2%, volume −18.4%, ASP +10.7%.
• ODM/OEM graphics cards: revenue +73.9%, volume −38.4%, ASP +181.0% — the group states it was awarded more orders on high-end cards.
• Raw material cost fell from 87.1% to 81.7% of sales.

Context from the balance sheet, which the company set up in advance: the FY2025 report states the group “intended to be more proactive on GPU management by holding up more inventories due to an expected supply constraint that could happen in FY2026” (p.20). Inventories doubled to HK$1,692.1m at 31 December 2025. Customer prepayments (contract liabilities) then rose 215.7% to HK$193.2m by 30 June 2026.

Management’s own outlook, filed 14 August 2026: graphics memory costs are expected to rise further; graphics-card shipment volumes fell substantially in 1H2026 versus 2H2025 and availability is likely to decline further in 2H2026; entry-level cards face the most severe shortages; a new GPU-server and AI-related business is scheduled to begin shipments in 2H2026; and the group “remains confident in achieving overall sales revenue growth in 2026” while 2H2026 “seems to be challenging as compared to the first half year”.

In the issuer’s 18 August 2026 results briefing, management narrowed that outlook to low-single-digit FY2026 revenue growth. It expected roughly 10% further GPU-allocation decline in 2H2026 versus 1H2026, an approximately 18% VGA average-selling-price increase, and the new GPU-server business to contribute above 15% of 2H2026 revenue. EMS and other PC-related sales were expected to fall 5%–10% from 1H2026. Management said gross margin “may sustain” and year-end net cash should remain strong, while describing FY2027 gaming-GPU, graphics-memory, system-memory and storage supply as tight and expensive. These are issuer statements, not analyst estimates.

The 24 April 2026 AGM minutes and shareholder Q&A add useful context. Management attributed FY2025’s margin improvement to new Blackwell products and the removal of U.S. trade restrictions after the headquarters move, declined to issue quantitative guidance at the meeting, described FY2021 as exceptional COVID-19 and cryptocurrency-mining demand, said it does not track costs or prepare profit-and-loss statements by product segment, stated a dividend-payout policy around 30%–40%, and said it intended to preserve a strong cash position for resilience and supplier opportunities.

Balance sheet

At 30 June 2026 the group held cash and bank balances of HK$2,899.1m against borrowings of HK$1,339.3m and lease liabilities of HK$55.0m — net cash of HK$1,504.7m, or HK$3.88 per share on 387,883,668 shares. Equity attributable to owners was HK$3,495.5m; net asset value per share HK$9.01, as stated by the company.

Computed on the same basis, however, the group was in net debt of HK$727m in FY2019 and HK$87m in FY2020, and moved to HK$2,941m of net cash in FY2021. The current position dates from that year.

Cash and bank balances less borrowings less current and non-current lease liabilities, each as reported.

Three features of the funding structure are worth stating plainly:

• All borrowings are repayable on demand. The note states banks hold an overriding right of repayment on demand “irrespective of whether the Group has complied with the covenants and met the scheduled repayment obligations”, which is why the entire balance is classified as current (AR FY2025 p.173). Undrawn facilities were HK$1,492.4m at 30 June 2026.
• A supplier-finance arrangement appeared for the first time in FY2025. HK$348,439,000 of trade payables had their due date extended from 30 days to 150 days; the comparative figures at 31 December 2024 and 1 January 2024 are nil. The separate import-financing facility has a maximum tenor of 120 days (AR FY2025 p.174).
• Trade receivables carry a 27.5% accumulated impairment — HK$318.6m against HK$1,157.8m gross at 30 June 2026 (21.8% at 31 December 2025). This dates from FY2021, when HK$321.7m of impairment losses on financial assets were recognised. Current ageing is clean: 98% of the net balance is within three months.

Accessible liquidity and financing-substance debt

The June 2026 balance sheet reports HK$2,899.1m of cash and bank balances, but the cash-flow statement identifies HK$2,819.4m of cash and cash equivalents after excluding HK$79.6m of pledged and greater-than-three-month deposits. Against HK$1,339.3m of bank borrowings and HK$55.0m of lease liabilities, this produces accounting net cash of HK$1,425.1m and cash coverage of accounting debt of 2.02x.

Cash location matters: the company-only balance sheet reports HK$110.8m of cash at the parent and HK$540.2m due from subsidiaries, versus HK$2,899.1m of gross cash at the group. The filings do not provide a complete legal-entity, currency, restriction and upstreaming map, so consolidated cash is not the same thing as demonstrated freely accessible parent liquidity.

The contractual bank-debt schedule at 30 June 2026 is HK$1,181.6m within one year and HK$157.7m in the following year, although the lender demand clauses cause the whole HK$1,339.3m balance to be classified as current; a demand-adjusted 12-month sources-and-uses test therefore counts the full amount. The group also disclosed HK$1,492.4m of undrawn facilities. The filings do not state whether those lines are committed, what conditions apply to drawing them, or how their covenants are defined, so the amount alone does not establish stress liquidity.

On the cash-flow side, the central 1H2026 bridge is HK$2,501.7m reported operating cash flow less HK$1,914.7m of derived non-cash import-loan drawdown, leaving a central HK$587.0m analytical CFO proxy. The proxy assumes implied new import financing settled trade balances; it is not an issuer-reported reclassification or the supplier-finance balance. Because the interim has no financing-liabilities reconciliation, alternative payables and import-loan balance methods produce a HK$583.1m–589.8m range. The central estimate is 1.08x profit attributable to owners for the half.

Ownership and governance

The annual-report statistics of shareholdings are dated 2 March 2026 (AR FY2025 pp.206–209), not the current date. At that cutoff there were 387,883,668 shares in issue, no treasury shares and one vote per share. Chairman and CEO Wong Shik Ho Tony held 14.284% directly; Wong Fong Pak 7.126%; Leung Wah Kan 6.471%; Ho Nai Nap 5.525%; and Rays Capital Partners Limited 5.137%. Multiple subsequent substantial-holder Form 3 filings, including an LC Capital filing on 13 August 2026, mean those percentages should not be presented as current until the forms are re-keyed.

Mrs Ho Wong Mary Mee-Tak is retained as a 14.19% substantial shareholder pending contrary evidence. Her director-cessation filing states that she retained her direct interest in 55,050,000 shares; the nil year-end directors’ table records that she was no longer a director, not that she sold the shares. No disposal filing was located in the 20 August cutoff sweep.

The board was reconstituted for the SGX listing: three long-serving Hong Kong independent non-executive directors were replaced by six Singapore-based independents. Directors’ fees rose from HK$1,556,000 in FY2024 to HK$12,993,000 in FY2025; key management personnel compensation was HK$83,541,000 against HK$66,411,000 (AR FY2025 p.182).

From the FY2018 Report of the Directors (p.53): during that year the company repurchased 74,700,000 shares at HK$5.00 per share from “the substantial shareholder of the Company”, an aggregate HK$373,500,000 paid out of retained profits, with all repurchased shares cancelled on delivery. The counterparty is not named in that passage. Equity fell from HK$1,208.0m to HK$877.3m that year despite HK$270.8m of profit.

Contingent liability

Graphics cards imported into the United States between 30 July 2020 and 2 January 2023 were declared under the tariff code for video game consoles. US Customs and Border Protection determined they fall under HTSUS 8473.30.1180, within List 3 of Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, attracting a 25% tariff. The estimated exposure is US$25m (approximately HK$198.1m). The group filed a litigation protest in July 2024 and has paid US$11.8m (approximately HK$92.3m), which it carries as an other receivable rather than an expense. As at the 1H2026 announcement there was no further update from CBP (1H2026 announcement p.29).

The share price and what came with its moves

Over the window PC Partner returned +265.3% on a dividend-adjusted basis; the Straits Times Index returned +52.0% and the median of the 3 listed comparisons −2.6%.

Download

A print-ready PDF of this page, for reading away from the screen: PC Partner Group evidence library (PDF). It carries the same content as this page — the fifteen-year record, what operating cash flow means here, where five years of cash went, the move to Singapore, the dropped IPO disclosure, the first half of 2026, the balance sheet, liquidity and financing debt, ownership and governance, the contingent liability, the share price and open questions — and the same omissions: no rating, no fair value, no forecast.

Sources

Where the primary sources are filed. SGX issuer page for PCT — announcements, financial statements, annual reports · PC Partner corporate site. Exchange portals re-file and purge documents over time; the text above cites each document by name and date so it can be found again. Tables on this page as data: JSON · CSV — the page’s own as-filed and recomputed tables, cell for cell, with their section and caption.

• 1H2026 condensed interim consolidated financial statements, announced 14 August 2026.
• Interim Results Briefing June 2026, dated 18 August 2026. The issuer-hosted PDF is marked RESTRICTED; it is linked as a primary source and is not copied onto this site.
• Minutes of the 24 April 2026 AGM and shareholder Q&A.
• Annual Report 2025, dated 17 March 2026.

The broader evidence archive also includes annual reports FY2011–FY2024; interim reports 1H2019–1H2025; the positive profit alert dated 16 July 2026; the 2011 HKEX listing prospectus; the SGX company introduction document dated 2 October 2024; the circular for the proposed voluntary withdrawal of the HKEX listing dated 18 September 2025; and 207 exchange announcements. The official issuer, exchange and brand routes were checked through 20 August 2026; no issuer item dated 19 or 20 August was found.

Evidence tags used in the underlying research: (R) reported in a primary document · (D) derived or recomputed, with the computation shown · (E) third-party or secondary · (O) opinion. This page carries R and D content only.

Correction, 16 September 2026. The last row of the “Where five years of cash went” table was labelled “Cash and bank balances at year end”, but its figures are the cash flow statement’s cash and cash equivalents at end of year, which exclude pledged deposits and time deposits with an initial maturity of over three months. The row is now labelled for what it shows; the figures are unchanged. The balance-sheet cash and bank balances, which the net cash row in the balance-sheet section is defined on, were HK$3,765.1m, HK$2,207.3m, HK$2,491.2m, HK$2,334.0m and HK$2,506.7m at the FY2021 to FY2025 year ends — HK$390.8m above the cash-equivalents figure at FY2023 and HK$156.6m above it at FY2024.